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CONSENT AND THE CRIMINAL LAW"
By LUCINDA VANDERVORT*
The author examines two proposals to expand legal recognition of individual control
over physical integrity. Protections for individual autonomy are discussed in relation
to the right to die, euthanasia, medical treatment, and consensual and assaultive
sexual behaviours. The author argues that at present, the legal doctrine of consent
protects only those individual preferences which are seen to be congruent with
dominant societal values; social preferences and convenience override all other
individual choices. Under these conditions, more freedom to waive rights of
physical integrity can only place socially vulnerable persons at great risk of abuse.
If individual and conventional societal perceptions and
preferences were the same, there would never be a difference
between what the individual considers to be a criminal assault and
what society labels as a crime. The individual would never consent
to a transaction that would be categorized as harmful by society.
Society would never question the propriety of individual choice. If,
in addition, we also communicated perfectly and we all appreciated
the social significance of the act of consent, the behaviour of a
potential victim would never appear ambiguous to anyone.
1
Mistakes about consent would never occur. The distinction between
assaultive and non-assaultive behaviour would be clear beyond
dispute to the assailant, the victim, and all third parties. There
would be perfect correspondence between assaultive and non-
Copyright, 1990, L Vandervort.
.Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan. The author wishes
to thank Professor Hans Mohr for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
I These two problems - differences between individual and social definitions of assault,
and ambiguity in communication with respect to consent, respectively - are central to papers
by Patrick Fitzgerald and Brenda Baker on consent and the criminal law, which were originally
delivered in Ottawa at the 15-16 May 1987, conference of the Canadian Section of the
International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy and subsequently
published in edited conference proceedings. See P. Fitzgerald, "Consent, Crime, and
Rationality" and B.M. Baker, "Consent, Assault and Sexual Assault" in A. Bayefsky, ed., Legal
Theory Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Publishing, 1988) at 209-21 and
223-38.
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consensual interventions with physical integrity. The result would
be as depicted in Figure One below.
Positive social value
Legitimate behaviour - Consent
Assault - No Consent
Negative social value
Figure One
But life is not so simple. Neither of these conditions -
consensus in perception and evaluation or perfect communication -
correspond to conditions in the social world. Human beings, even
when they share the same general values, are not always in perfect
agreement about what is the case or about the relative value of
particular states of affairs in the world. Furthermore, no one has
direct knowledge of the thoughts, attitudes, preferences, and feelings
of other persons. To ascertain what these are, it is necessary either
to ask people or to interpret their behaviour, including any
statements or comments they are known to have made.
Decisions about application of the criminal law of assault in
cases involving intervention against physical integrity are therefore
based on interpretation of the behaviour of all the parties
concerned. Such interpretation necessarily occurs in the context of
the law of assault, and with reliance on social and linguistic
conventions, including formal and informal normative conventions
about interpersonal transactions. The result is depicted in Figure
Two below.
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Figure Two
In a substantial number of cases, the formal legal decision
disregards the presence or absence of consent by the individual
victim. Indeed, in Figure Two, we see that it is always societal
preference, not consent by the individual, that determines whether
a particular physical intervention with that person is classified in law
as an assault. When individual consent and societal preference
coincide, we say that the law gives effect to individual choice. When
the two conflict and societal preference governs, we say this is an
exception to the general rule. Such is the power of rhetoric. It
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enables us to say one thing, do the opposite, and yet remain
unaware of the dichotomy. Consequently, it is widely believed that
the criminal law of assault protects the individual's right to determine
what personal physical interventions to permit (right of self-
determination).
If we are to move closer towards a law of assault that
actually achieves this goal, some changes are required. Fitzgerald
and Baker both suggest, with reference to euthanasia and sexual
assault respectively, that we simply attach more significance to
individual choice to indicate whether any particular physical
intervention against the person is an assault and a crime, and less
to the prima facie social legitimacy of behaviour or its conformance
with convention. This proposal is in accord with the general
principle of common law that where the interests of the individual
are at issue, it is ordinarily that individual who has the right to
determine what his or her own interests are and to have that
determination respected by other persons.
To implement the Fitzgerald and Baker proposal in a manner
that actually enhances self-determination, and thus achieves the
purported goal, poses a greater challenge than is at first apparent.
It appears disarmingly simple to do what they propose. It is
therefore understandable that neither Fitzgerald nor Baker confront
the problems of implementation in a fully satisfying manner. Indeed,
it is only when the problems that are discussed by each - dissension
and ambiguity respectively - are used as foils for one another, and
the interaction between the two types of problems is considered, that
we gain an overview of the impediments to implementation that
must be dealt with if individual choices are to be significant for
criminal assault law. The effects of both lack of consensus in
perception and evaluation and of imperfect communication, caused
in part by the "performative"2 ambiguity of many acts of consent,
2 Performatives are utterances that do things. Examples include: "I promise," and "I
agree." An equivalent effect on reciprocal obligations and expectations may often be achieved,
or be assumed to have been achieved, by another combination of words, especially in the
context of an ongoing conversation or relationship. Therein lies a major problem. Consent,
when it is effective, changes interpersonal obligations and expectations. These obligations and
expectations determine the normative significance of post-consensual behaviour. Therefore,
any ambiguity in consent necessarily results in ambiguity in the normative significance of
subsequent behaviour. For an introduction to analysis of performative utterances, see J.L.
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must be recognized and dealt with in legal analysis. Every assault or
putative assault must b6 scrutinized from both of these perspectives
simultaneously.
I submit that examination of our experience with the law of
consent and its practical role in the criminal law demonstrates that
individual choices that are not congruent with dominant social
perceptions and preferences are routinely denied recognition b, the
criminal justice system. When collective preference or interest, and
individual preference or choice are in conflict, the criminal law
doctrines of the Anglo-American legal systems are used to deny
recognition and enforcement to individual preference. It is therefore
doubtful that law reform which purports to expand the choices
permitted to individuals will necessarily have the practical effect of
empowering individuals, even if it is undertaken in the name of
liberty and respect for persons.4
To understand how doctrine is used to deny efficacy to
individual choice, compare Figures One and Two above. Figure
One depicts a mythical total consensus between individualpreferences
and social perceptions of legitimacy. In actuality (depicted in Figure
Two), individual/societal consensus is not total. Only in quadrants
A and D of Figure Two is there consensus. In quadrants B and C
of Figure Two, individual and societal preference conflict, and the
individual's choice is overruled by the societal assessment of the net
value or normative significance of the behaviour.
Austin, How to do Things wih Words, 2d ed. by J.0. Urmson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965). For an analysis of consent as a performative, see N. Brett, "Consent and Sexual
Assault" (Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, 1982) [unpublished]. In her paper,
Baker, supra, note 1 refers to Brett's analysis of consent as a performative.
3 That is, the socially dominant interest which invariably claims to speak for the collective
interest.
4 Readers who wish to examine the basis for these assertions about the role of the
doctrine of consent in Anglo-American legal systems in greater detail may wish to see the
following articles in which I have analyzed these, and related questions, at length and in a
variety of contexts: L Vandervort, "Legal Aspects of the Medical Treatment of Penitentiary
Inmates" (1977) 3 Queen's L... 368; L. Vandervort, "The Lawyer-Client Relationship in
Ontario: Use and Abuse of Authority to Act" (1984) 16 Ottawa L Rev. 526; L. Vandervort,
"Social Justice in the Modem Regulatory State: Duress, Necessity and the Consensual Model
in Law" (1987) 6 Law & Phil. 205; and L Vandervort, "Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault:
Consent and Mens Red' (1987-88) 2(2) Can. J. Women & L 233.
1990] 489
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Under paternalism (Figure Two, quadrant B), the behaviour,
whether it entails mere touching or hurting or the more serious
consequence of harming or killing, is labeled assault. Consent by
the individual victim is not permitted to have a legal effect in such
cases. To use the language of performatives, even where the
consent is clear, and is exercised on a voluntary and informed basis
by a competent person with full legal capacity, social paternalism
prohibits such a waiver of the right against intervention from having
the normative "neutralizing" effect of an effectively executed
performative.5 Under Canadian criminal law, euthanasia falls in this
quadrant. Other examples include sexual acts with minors, excessive
violence in sports and in the control or discipline of dependents or
subordinates, and sodomy on a consenting adult. All of these
examples, including euthanasia, can also be analyzed as possible
instances of invalid or ineffective consent. But use of that analytic
approach arguably, only reflects and confirms, rather than determines,
the negative social assessment of such behaviours. It is precisely
because the behaviour is prima facie illegitimate, because it is
assessed negatively, that we scrutinize with suspicion any purported
consent to submit to the behaviour.
By contrast (in quadrant C of Figure Two), the prima facie
social legitimacy of the behaviour renders it "not-wrongful" in the
criminal sense even though the victim has not waived the right not
to be subjected to any physical intervention. Many cases in which
sexual assault is alleged but not prosecuted, or prosecuted but
without success, fall in this quadrant. The prima facie legitimacy of
sexual behaviours, in general, serves as a shield against scrutiny of
consent and, when consent is examined, facilitates a finding of
implied consent or the conclusion that the accused may have had a
bona fide belief that the victim consented.
The crucial role of prima facie social legitimacy is also seen
in current legal analysis of consent to medical treatment. Medical
treatments whichyare reasonable by professional standards are only
categorized as wrongful if the patient positively refused treatment.
Otherwise, even if informed consent was not obtained (the patient,
though conscious and competent, made no affirmative choice
Baker, supra, note 1 at 224.
[VOL. 28 No. 2
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whatsoever with respect to treatment) provision of reasonable
medical treatment is seen as not-wrongful.
The dominant view, in Anglo-American legal systems, is that
medical treatment, provided in such circumstances, is neither a
criminal or civil assault, but, at worst, a negligent breach of the civil
duty of disclosure. Classification of the problem as one of
negligence, rather than assault, changes the grounds for the action
and ensures that professional criteria and standards of disclosure are
applied to dispose of the case. It is clear that this approach curtails
effective individual autonomy. 6 Individual concerns and preferences,
with respect to treatment options that are not encompassed by
professional standards, are not protected. This approach reflects the
view that health care providers must be protected from civil liability,
as well as criminalization, as long as the medical interventions and
criteria used are within the bounds of established medical practice.
Medical treatment is prima facie a legitimate activity.
Therefore, a practitioner, who provides a recognized form of
treatment to a patient for whom such treatment is not medically
inappropriate, is not said to act wrongfully, in a criminal sense, as
long as the patient did not refuse treatment. As long as the
treatment itself is not grossly negligent, the legal result is the same,
even when the net effect of treatment is to cause harm to the
patient. What we see here is deference by legal doctrine and the
legal system to professional interests. It is believed to be in the
public interest not to prohibit health care workers from infringing
the individual's right to be free from physical interventions not
expressly consented to. Only interventions performed contrary to
the patient's express refusal are prohibited.
Medical treatment in accordance with professional standards,
and sexual transactions not causing death or serious physical injury,
are both examples of social interactions in which the prima facie
social legitimacy of the behaviour generally governs disposition of
the case at criminal law. These examples suggest that agents who
engage in socially legitimate activities have only a qualified duty to
6 This analysis ofithe implications of the dominant legal approach to consent in the
context of medical treatment is also adopted by S. McLean, "The Right to Consent to Medical
Treatment" in T. Campbell, D. Goldberg, S. McLean et al. eds, Human Rights: From Rhetoric
to Reality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at 148-72.
1990]
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respect the autonomy rights of persons directly affected by those
activities. In such cases, the label assault is not ordinarily applied,
even though no express consent is given to the interventions the
activities cause. The individual, whose right of physical integrity is
violated, has, at most, a civil remedy for negligence. Failure to
invoke the criminal law, in such cases, affirms that society views the
right to physical integrity to be defeasible at the discretion of agents
engaged in legitimate social activities. The sole exception arises
when the bearer of the right expressly and unequivocally refuses to
waive the right (and is able to prove this to have been the case
after the fact). In those circumstances, it is the agent's flagrant
disregard for the individual's right to physical integrity that causes
otherwise socially legitimate behaviour to be characterized as
illegitimate.
Prosecution of health care providers for criminal assault is
almost unknown in cases where the treatment provided conforms
with accepted medical practice, and the patient was not forcibly
confined contrary to law. Even in cases of sexual assault where the
accused admits that the victim did not expressly consent, it is
common for the case to be classified as unfounded and not selected
for prosecution or, if prosecuted, not to result in conviction. In
such cases, implied consent 7 (behaviour that is interpreted as being
consistent with consent) is often taken to constitute an effective
waiver. As a result, there is, in law, no actus reus (criminal act).
Should consent not be found to have been implied, the accused may
still assert that he or she believed the complainant consented. At
present, all mistakes of this type are classified as mistakes of fact
and, if credible, are tolerated and serve to excuse. It is therefore
often difficult to establish that the accused was aware that consent
was absent, even when the accused admits to having been aware
that the victim had said "No."8
7 Discussed by Baker, supra, note 1 at 229.
8 Elsewhere (see Vandervort, "Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault," supra, note 4), I have
argued that some mistakes about consent are mistakes of law, not fact, and therefore do not
excuse. There are strong similarities between some aspects of my approach and the Brett-
Baker approach in that all three analyze consent as communication of permission. There are
some crucial points of difference, however. I maintain, for example, that to be effective as
a waiver for the purposes of the criminal law, consent must be express or explicit. That is,
[VOL. 28 No. 2
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The medical and sexual assault cases demonstrate that
individual rights of autonomy and self-determination are protected
by the criminal law only when to do so serves the public interest as
defined by societal values - values as perceived by public employees
and officials including members of the judiciary. If our social world
were one of consensus in perception and evaluation, and effective
communication (Figure One), this result would not be problematic.
In our world of dissension and ambiguity (Figure Two), it is a
matter of grave concern. Examples such as those above demonstrate
the ease with which the principles of autonomy, self-determination,
and respect for persons can be given lip-service, while effective
enforcement of these rights on behalf of individuals is avoided. On
those rare occasions when the issue is overtly addressed, such
decisions are defended as necessary to protect the public interest.
Yet surely modern criminal law is either committed to the
protection of individual rights of autonomy and freedom from non-
consensual interference, or it is not.9 These examples suggest that
in present practice it is not. The commitment is instead primarily to
the preservation of collective societal values as interpreted by the
legal system of the day. Individual rights are protected only insofar
there must be communication of unequivocal agreement; nothing less can be permitted to
suffice to waive the duty of non-interference. Otherwise, individual rights will continue to be
protected only when others (police, judge, jury, etc.) believe it would have been appropriate
to assert them. Furthermore, although I would agree with Baker that to proceed in the face
of mere acquiescence is reckless, especially in circumstances where the behaviour of the
victim may be influenced by fear, I do not believe that an analytic approach which focuses
on recklessness will be effective for the purpose of protecting individual rights for reasons
explained at length in the article cited above. Findings of recklessness reflect collective social
perceptions and values, not individual ones. Likewise, I would not refer to consent as a
matter of objective fact as Baker does. Behaviour is in the realm of empirical fact; consent
is in the social realm. Failure to appreciate the role of consent as a performative, a social
act with normative effect, is, I submit, more appropriately described as a mistake of law than
as a mistake of fact. A mistake about the behaviour of another person (as, for example, that
"She said, 'Oh yes!' when in fact what she said was "You jerk!") would be a mistake of fact.
9 It is submitted that the goals of the criminal law in a society change in response to
fundamental changes in the political arrangements. Thus, what was originally a vehicle to
protect, directly and indirectly, the king's property and security interests, is now a vehicle to
protect the interests of individuals, singularly and collectively. At issue is whether and how
individual sovereignty over the person is to be given full effect by the criminal law, a public
vehicle whose substance and institutions originated under, and remain to some extent shaped
by, political arrangements that gave less recognition and protection to individual rights than
national constitutional arrangements and international public law now provides.
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as this is seen to converge with that primary goal. Enforcement of
the criminal law is avoided when positive action to protect individual
rights would interfere with the maintenance of traditional social
power relationships - themselves believed to contribute to
maximizing the achievement of collective social goals. Individual
choices that do not coincide with the dominant interpretation of
social values (and may also conflict with the interests of one of the
more powerful social groups) can be ignored or disregarded almost
with impunity.10 At present, the right to physical integrity is actually
protected by criminal law only against behaviour that is prima facie
illegitimate. Furthermore, when the criminal law is activated against
illegitimate behaviour, a victim's waiver of the right not to be
assaulted may also be disregarded.
Using the analytic framework here developed to examine the
pro-choice proposals by Fitzgerald and Baker, we see that each of
these proposals would reduce non-congruence (Figure Two) between
the individual victim's choice and societal use of the labels assault,
wrongful intervention, and crime. Paternalism and social convenience
would pre-empt individual preference in fewer cases. The effects of
the changes they propose are depicted in Figure Three (next page).
Some consensual interventions, previously prohibited on the
ground that they contravened social values, are now reinterpreted
and recognized as legitimate (quadrant B). Legitimacy is contingent,
however, on individual choice. In quadrant C, individual choice is
now recognized to be determinative of the quality of some acts that
are prima facie legitimate. Two areas of non-congruence remain.
Individual choices that are still interpreted as unacceptably
destructive of collective social values continue to be without legal
effect (the residual paternalism in quadrant B). As well, in many
instances individual refusal to consent to interventions that occur in
the ordinary course of social life and are prima facie legitimate still
will not result in the intervention being labeled as an assault (social
convenience in quadrant C). If the social interpretation of the
negative impact on the victim can be shown to outweigh both the
positive social value attached to the activity during which the
10 Legal doctrine, as such, does not say this directly of course, but it is submitted that
this is the net effect of the administration of criminal justice.
[VOL 28 NO. 2
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Figure Three
intervention occurred, and the cost and inconvenience of enforcing
the criminal law, only then will individual refusal to consent be
officially recognized, and the intervention deemed assaultive. Thus,
a frivolous or purely private and idiosyncratic use of the criminal
law, to penalize behaviour which is prima facie legitimate, remains
barred.11
1 1 It is clear that both residual categories paternaism and abandonment remain inherently
problematic from a theoretical point of view. (Of course, Fitzgerald referred repeatedly to
this problem insofar as it arises in the context of paternalism.) Given that, in theory, personal
autonomy is the interest protected, how does society justify disregarding any choices by the
(A) Positive individual value (B)
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When an activity is prima fade legitimate (quadrant C), any
ambiguity about the quality of the impact of the activity on the
individual impedes effective enforcement of the criminal law. Baker
observes that many judges have difficulty determining whether a
sexual transaction was assaultive when the level of violence used was
not so excessive as to make the question moot (such a case would
fall in quadrant D and be seen as illegitimate behaviour). Baker
then uses this example to highlight the unique role that voluntary
and informed consent has in transforming the normative significance
of a sexual transaction. Her discussion of the prerequisites of
effective consent (effective to confer permission) clarifies why judges
who work without an understanding of consent as a performative (a
speech act that changes interpersonal obligations) find the degree
of force used to be the only index of the legal quality of an
allegedly assaultive sexual transaction. Indeed, precisely because it
has been difficult to enforce sexual assault laws based on proof of
non-consent, recent law reform in some jurisdictions has shifted the
entire focus to the use of force and violence in sexual transactions.
12
Baker, however, argues that the absence of consent should be
retained as an essential element of the offence. She states:
This serves to emphasize that what is wrong about these sexual offences is that they
violate certain rights possessed by individuals to the exclusive disposition of their
persons in relation to sexual matters according to their choice, this right being
reflected in the requirement of consent.
13
Precisely. And because consent (rather than violence) is the
element critical for definition of the offence, it is essential that the
law find a new and better way to interpret and apply the law of
consent. The same must be said for all other areas of the law
where, in theory, legal legitimacy is contingent on individual choice.
individual most affected? An answer may lie in the concept of a continuum. At one end, that
which is seen as trivial in its impact on personal integrity and capacity to function
autonomously, at the other, that which is destructive of that same capacity. With regard to
the trivial, individuals are left to fend for themselves, yet they are also prohibited from making
choices that are seen to be destructive of integrity and capacity. Only autonomous choices
in the middle of the continuum, between the two extremes, are seen to be expressions of the
protected interest, and are therefore given positive support by the community.
12 Baker, supra, note 1 at 226-31.
13 IbM. at 231.
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Fitzgerald uses the examples of euthanasia, the administration
of life-shortening pain-killers, and organ donations to illustrate his
point that our collective intuitions about what is wrongful do change.
He argues that euthanasia, like the other two examples, may not be
wrongful as long as the person undergoing the intervention consents
and the intervention is "for accepted social purposes."
14 Waivers of
the right against interventions that result in death, permanent harm,
or pain would be permitted within his scheme, but only when this
would serve the ends of the individual either directly or indirectly.
He emphasizes that the individual is not to be used as a means.
Individual rights are not to be simply sacrificed in the collective
interest. To protect individual rights in euthanasia cases, and yet
expand the options available to individuals who believe they would
choose to die under certain circumstances, Fitzgerald proposes that
a "living will" and a medical panel's certificate be required. We
must ask what the actual effects of such arrangements would be.
I submit that our experience with the law of consent has
clearly shown, as was briefly sketched above, that if the ultimate
locus of control in decision-making about interventions against
physical integrity does not remain with the individual, individual
rights often will be sacrificed in the collective interest. The locus of
control over decisions affecting individuals is of critical importance
because each of us interprets and evaluates the significance of
possible outcomes within a unique societal-cultural context. Our
interpretation of what constitutes abuse of an individual and of the
extent to which individual interests may best be served by their
subordipation to collective ends is never impersonal, atemporal,
ahistorical, or acultural. How we identify with collective societal
interests and those of the individual (and the nature and extent of
our understanding of those interests and our opinions as to how
they may best be served) inevitably influences the outcome of our
reasoning as we attempt to resolve conflict between individual and
collective interests. It is undeniable that there will often be conflict,
sometimes real and sometimes apparent. Conflicts invite abuse.
Some interests will be favoured at the expense of others despite
14 Fitzgerald, supra, note 1 at 218.
15 Ibid. at 220.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
attempts made in good faith to comply with the requirement that
any outcome must be fully justified with reference to what are
believed to be the best interests of the individual affected.
Many times in the twentieth century, socially convenient legal
rationalizations for ordering or permitting the abuse of socially
vulnerable individuals and groups of individuals have proven
injurious or deadly for millions of people. Consider Native peoples,
Jews, Blacks, religious and political dissidents, prisoners, the
handicapped, and women. Therefore, when Fitzgerald states that
sometimes acts of euthanasia are arguably "worthy acts deserving the
victim's gratitude,"16 we should feel uneasy. The fact that he means
well is not enough. Where social convenience coincides with killing
(as it would in some such cases), harming, hurting, or merely
touching, the possibility of abuse cannot be simply noted and
dismissed as a simple problem of implementation. To do so is to
invite movement towards congruence between social and individual
preference, not by means of recognition of genuine individual
preference (quadrant B, Figure Three), but by means of disregard of
individual preference (quadrant C, Figure Three) in deference to
dominant social perceptions and convenience.
Through reflection and re-education our views of life and death
may well change. Our attitude towards the death of those who are
terminally ill or whose quality of life is irreversibly low may come to
be generally more positive. This change in attitude may, in turn,
affect both social policy with respect to allocation of health care
resources, and the preferences and choices of individuals with
respect to when and how they die. If the criminal law is changed
to permit individuals a right to die under certain circumstances, the
result could be a shift towards greater congruence between
individual and social avoidance of the use of the terms wrongful and
assault in reference to acts causing death under special conditions.
Such a shift would not suppress individual preference and deny
individual choice as long as the recognition that the net normative
significance of the individual's death by choice actually is congruent
with societal values is based on the significance we, as a society,
attach to individual self-determination and autonomy. But I remain
16 Ibid. at 215.
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sceptical. The odds are that social recognition of the legitimacy of
such acts of killing will instead be based on the social convenience
of being relieved of dependent, non-productive, or otherwise useless
individuals.
Fitzgerald's problem could perhaps be regarded as a question of
legal classification. He asks whether killing with the consent of the
victim should be regarded as legitimate social behaviour in
circumstances where dying is interpreted by society as in the
interests of the victim. To answer in the affirmative, as Fitzgerald
does, appears to expand the effective sphere of individual autonomy.
But I submit that it is unlikely to have that effect as long as the
doctrine of consent continues to be interpreted as it is at present.
Under present doctrine, once the prohibition against consensual
euthanasia is removed, a valid and express consent to be killed
would not actually be required. Startling though it may be, that
conclusion is based on analysis of the doctrine of consent as it is
currently interpreted. It is difficult for a dead person to argue that
his or her consent was not implied. Social convenience, and other
societal assessments of the propriety or acceptability of the killing,
will therefore easily defeat a vulnerable victim's right not to be
killed. In the case of euthanasia, only by allowing express
affirmative individual choice to determine the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the subsequent physical intervention, can we hope to
preclude the possibility that social convenience and preference will
continue to determine the ultimate legal characterization of the
intervention.17  This applies as well to all other types of
interventions against physical integrity.
17 A further problem lies in the fact that individual choice is exercised within a broad
societal context, as well as an immediate social situation, and is inevitably influenced by that
context. Societal influence (I would call this so-dur-ness), if unconscionable, may invalidate
the performative-normative effect of individual choice, just as an immediate physical threat
would in many cases. The definition of unconscionability is a problem for public policy.
Applied to the present example, the question would be whether the societal influences on a
person who purports to choose to die are ones which are consistent with the contextual
prerequisites of valid and effective choice. For example, can ill persons who are unemployed
and homeless in a society with significant unemployment and inadequate welfare and medical
care programs validly waive their right not to be killed when their medical condition, as
assessed by a medical panel, warrants killing? And who would have standing to initiate the
assessment process?
1990]
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In short, I argue that to increase latitude in law for
individual choice without increasing effective protection for
individual control over outcomes chosen, is to place the individual's
rights of self-determination and autonomy at greater risk of abuse
than exists at present. Greater latitude for individual choice can be
achieved by re-examining and removing legal prohibitions, as
Fitzgerald proposes. More effective legal protection for individual
control over outcomes chosen can be achieved by interpreting the
law of consent so as to restrict legal legitimacy to those
interventions with the person that the individual expressly and
affirmatively permits. This takes us in the direction Baker proposed
but further.18 In theory, both of these directions for re-examination
of criminal assault law should be pursued if the law is to be a
vehicle to affirm and protect individual rights of self-determination
and autonomy.
In practice, by contrast, the two types of reform cannot be
given equal priority. Development in the law of consent to
recognize and protect individual preference, even when that
preference conflicts with societal convenience, would enhance the
autonomy, dignity, and quality of life of many people, especially
members of disempowered social groups whose choices most need
legal protection. Without such protection for individual choice,
removal of the specific prohibition against euthanasia would place
the very existence of these same people at risk. Under present
social conditions, removal of other prohibitions against interventions
that compromise the physical well-being of the individual are not
likely to be of equal practical benefit to all persons either. Until
the conscious choices we make daily about our physical integrity
cease to be so easily defeasible, we simply cannot afford the false
luxury of concern for the purported loss of dignity involved in
lingering as a helpless or unconscious dependent. For the present,
the notion that the two directions for legal development are of even
roughly equal significance for enhancement of individual self-
determination and autonomy should be laughable. But perhaps here
again, this time in setting the public agenda for reform of the
criminal law, individual and societal preferences conflict.
18 See supra, note 8.
[VOL 28 No. 2
